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1. INTRODUCTION
America is unhealthy.' America faces an obesity epidemic.'
The food consumed by Americans is making them fat.' Americans,
bombarded every single day by negative headlines like these, are
becoming more and more health conscious.' This newfound com-
mitment to health is reflected in the food and beverages Americans
purchase.
American consumers view food and beverage labels as the best
way to establish a healthy connection between the food they pur-
chase and their lifestyle - the most important or easiest step to im-
prove overall health and wellness.' A recent survey found thirty per-
cent of Americans look at food and beverage labels much more than
a year ago, an additional thirty-one percent read labels slightly more
frequently, and forty-seven percent always examine the ingredients
list.' Many consumers trying to improve their overall wellness will
purchase food and beverages labeled as 'natural,' thinking the term
* The author received his J.D. from the University of Miami and currently is a
Presidential Management Fellow with the General Services Administration. He
would like to thank Professor Osamudia James for all her hard work and skill help-
ing craft an idea into a full article. The author dedicates this article to his mother,
the greatest teacher he could ever have.
1. Jaime Hoguin, America the Unhealthy, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004
/02/26/ health/main602417.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2009); Mathew Reeves,
Study Finds Very Few Adults Leading Healthy Lifestyles, Apr. 25, 2005, available at
http://news.msu.edu/story/31/.
2. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. OBESITY TRENDS 1985 -
2007, http://www.cdc.gov/ nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/trend/maps/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009); Obese Americans Now Outweigh the Merely Overweight, REUTERS,
Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/
idUSTRE50 863H20090109.
3. Paul A. Stitt, Why Are Americans So Fat, NOHA NEWS, Vol. XIX No. 2, 4, 4-6
(1994), available at http://www. nutrition4health.org/nohanews/NNSp94
AmericansFat.htm.
4. See Americans Point Fingers at Themselves for Obesity Problem; Consumers Do Not
Blame Food Industry, New National Survey Reveals, BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 10, 2004,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOEIN/ is_2004_Feb_10/ai
113099519/; Adrea Miller, Child Obesity Rates Triple, THE WALTON TRIBUNE, Nov.
27, 2005, available at http://www.waltontribune.com/story.lasso?ewcd=
2368flf8041ae930 (examining the growing concern over childhood obesity and
providing suggestions of ways to achieve greater health).
5. See Laurie Demeritt, What Consumers Look for on Product Labels, NATURAL
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indicates a healthier product.7  Sixty-three percent of consumers
report a preference for food labeled as 'natural.'" Food and bever-
age manufacturers also recognize the value of the word 'natural' and
include the phrase on as many labels as possible to maximize profits.
These factors make products labeled 'natural' one of the largest and
fastest growing segments of the food and beverage industry today,
accounting for billions of dollars in annual sales. Nonetheless, most
consumers actually do not understand the real differences, if any,
between traditional food and beverages and those bearing the term
'natural.'
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates what ap-
pears on the vast majority of food and beverage labels.' Certain la-
beling clams, such as 'reduced fat' or 'high fiber', must meet strict
requirements, while other claims, such as 'natural', do not receive
such intense regulation.'o The FDA chose to place few restrictions,
outside of banning artificial and synthetic ingredients and additives,
on the use of the term 'natural."'
Due to the FDA's liberal definition, confusion currently exists
as to what ingredients may be used in products labeled 'natural.'
High fructose corn syrup (HFCS) is produced by a complex scien-
tific manufacturing process and used as an ingredient in millions of
products, many labeled 'natural.' Several consumers recently at-
tempted to use state tort law to answer the question of whether the
use of HFCS is in accord with the FDA's definition of a 'natural'
product. The New Jersey District Court became the first court to
issue an opinion on this question in the case Holk v. Snapple Beverage
Corporation (Holk)." The Holk court ultimately dismissed the suit
7. Karen Collins, What a 'Natural' Label Really Means, MSN HEALTH AND
FITNESS, http://health.msn.com/nutrition/ articlepage.aspx?cp-documentid=10023
6030, [hereinafter What Natural Really Means] (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
8. How Natural is Natural?, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA, Jan.14, 2008, available at
http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/ Financial-Industry/How-natural-is-natural.
9. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food Labeling and Nutrition Over-
view, http://www.fda.gov/food/labeling Nutition/default.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2009).
10. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food Label Helps Consumers Make
Healthier Choices, http://www.fda.gov/ forconsumers/consumerupdates/
ucm094536.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
11. Claims of 'natural,' 'all natural,' and '100% natural' are used interchangeably
and are not regulated differently in any manner. For the purposes of this article no
changes will be recommended to this current system. All discussion will merely
mention the phrase 'natural', but will apply to all of these terms.
12. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009). After the initial
completion of this article, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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after examining Congress' intent behind the passing of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and then finding the Plain-
tiffs state tort claims impliedly preempted by the federal statute."
Holk explained allowing such claims through state common law or
statutes requires a court to effectively regulate in a field Congress
intended the FDA to occupy exclusively and also creates obstacles to
Congress' objective in creating the FDCA."
The California Northern District Court reached the opposite
conclusion in Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. (Lockwood) by refus-
ing to dismiss a similar suit, which brought state tort law claims
against a manufacturer using HFCS as an ingredient on a product
labeled 'natural."' The Lockwood court first pointed out Holk
committed an error in its preemption analysis by not considering
the amendments added to the FDCA by the Nutritional Labeling
and Education Act (NLEA)." The Lockwood court found the Plain-
tiffs claims not impliedly preempted because: Congress, by passing
the NLEA, specifically contemplated and included state enforce-
ment in conjunction with the federal regulations; the FDA declined
to issue a formal regulation regarding the labeling usage of 'natural'
despite several petitions and FDA-acknowledged consumer confu-
sion; and manufacturers could comply with the FDA's existing pol-
icy on 'natural' and still follow the state laws providing the basis of
the claim."
Even though Holk failed to consider the NLEA in its analysis,
the court ultimately came to the correct conclusion by finding the
Plaintiffs claim preempted. By failing to dismiss its Plaintiffs claim,
Lockwood misconstrued Congress' intent behind the passage of the
FDCA, the NLEA, and the mandate of the FDA. If a court hears the
Lockwood case, and decides HFCS cannot be used in food and bev-
overturned the initial decision of Holk. None of the reasons given by the court to
overturn the original Holk decision alter any of the analysis or conclusions of this
article.
13. See generally id.
14. Id. at 455-56.
15. Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
See also Hilt v. Arizona Beverage Co., 2009 WL 449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009) for a
substantially similar case to Lockwood. Plaintiff sued Arizona Beverage under Cali-
fornia laws for using high fructose corn syrup in a beverage labeled 'natural'
(among other claims, including certain deceptive naming claims). The Hilt court
conducted a preemption analysis and denied Arizona's motion to dismiss using the
same, yet less thorough, reasoning as found in Lockwood; therefore this article
does not conduct any substantial analysis of the Hilt decision.
16. Lockwoo4, 597 F.Supp. 2d at 1034.
17. Id. at 1032-34.
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erages labeled 'natural,' the judiciary will be overstepping its author-
ity, ignoring long standing traditions of administrative deference,
and overriding established FDA policy. The Lockwood suit, and any
similar lawsuits brought in the future, should be dismissed due to
issues of preemption and primary jurisdiction. Further, by using its
authority, and existing legal precedents and practices, the FDA must
change its current policy statement, clear up the current confusion,
and issue a firm regulation banning the use of HFCS in food and
beverages labeled 'natural.'
Part II of this article discusses the typical framework for a pre-
emption analysis and presents the findings of the Holk and Lock-
wood courts. Part II then moves on to explore the flaws in those
analyses, illustrates several reasons why the Lockwood decision is
incorrect, and concludes by demonstrating any lawsuit challenging
the usage of HFCS in 'natural' food and beverages must be dis-
missed due to implied preemption or primary jurisdiction. Part III
examines just how the FDA should regulate the term 'natural' on
food and beverage labels, with particular emphasis placed on the
usage of HFCS. Part III concludes by providing reasons why using
HFCS as an ingredient is outside the scope of the FDA's current
policy regarding the usage of 'natural' and therefore manufacturers
must be prohibited from using HFCS as an ingredient in food and
beverages featuring the term 'natural' on the label.
II. FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION PREEMPTS STATE TORT CLAIMS
ATTEMPTING TO EXCLUDE HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP FROM FOOD
AND BEVERAGES LABELED 'NATURAL'
The court system cannot be used to answer the question of
whether HFCS is an acceptable ingredient in food and beverages
labeled 'natural' because adjudication in this area is preempted by
federal law or regulation. Holk, even through flawed reasoning,
reached this correct conclusion. Lockwood, despite correctly point-
ing out Holk's misstep, still failed in its preemption reasoning by
overlooking or misconstruing key factors.
A. Traditional Preemption Analysis
The Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the United States Con-
stitution states federal law is "the Supreme Law of the Land."'"
18. U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
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There is a need for the Constitution and federal laws to have the
same meaning throughout every state; therefore any Congressional
act will preempt a state statute, and the Supreme Court has held
both legislative statutes and administrative regulations can preempt
state law."0 In all preemption analyses, courts begin by looking at
Congressional intent or purpose.' The deciding court must also
remember historic police powers of the States" are traditionally not
to be superseded by a Federal Act unless Congress clearly mani-
fested such a purpose." The primary focus of a preemption analysis
is to determine the extent to which Congress intended to replace
state law with federal law." The Supremacy Clause preempts state
or local law in three circumstances: express preemption and the twin
implied preemption categories of field and conflict preemption.
1. Express Preemption
Express preemption occurs when a federal statute or regulation
contains specific, clear language explaining when a state or local law
is to be exempted. Many federal statutes merely prohibit state or
local laws that are "inconsistent" with the federal statute or regula-
tion." This allows states to provide regulation and enforcement in
accordance with the federal rule." Some federal statutes include
19. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 324-27, 34043 (1816).
20. See Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 151-55
(1982).
21. "Congressional intent or purpose is the 'ultimate touchstone' in every pre-
emption analysis." Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996).
22. States' traditional police powers include the ability to define criminal law and
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 66 (2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting). See also, e.g., Lisa Kinney Helvin, Adminis-
trative Preemption in Areas of Traditional State Authority, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV.
617,623-25 (2008) (providing overview of when state action may be recognized as a
traditional police power).
23. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has
legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied the court starts with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be super-
seded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
24. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (plurality opin-
ion).
25. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006).
26. See, e.g., id.
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language, known as a savings clause, indicating Congress intended
to preempt some, but not all aspects of state common law.
2. Implied Preemption
The other two circumstances giving rise to preemption are con-
sidered implied preemption. Field preemption occurs when the
federal regulation is so all-encompassing there is a reasonable infer-
ence Congress purposefully left no room for state supplementa-
tion.2' Legal scholars identify several distinct questions relevant to a
court's field preemption analysis: (1) is the area in question one in
which the federal government has traditionally played a unique role;
(2) has Congress manifested a clear intent in the text or legislative
history that the federal law should be functioning exclusively in the
field in question; (3) would allowing state and local regulations in
the area actually or potentially interfere with comprehensive federal
regulatory efforts; and (4) does the law serve an important tradi-
tional state or local interest?'
The final type of implied preemption, conflict preemption, can
occur in two instances. Conflict preemption can occur when "state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress" or "when compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility."3"
Conflict preemption can even still exist when there is an express
preemption provision and the state law in issue is not expressly pre-
empted.3' The state statute is then nullified to the extent it conflicts
with federal law." It is important to note the three categories of
preemption are not rigidly distinct, and "field preemption may be
understood as a species of conflict preemption: [a] state law that
falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress' intent (either
express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation. "3
Implied preemption analysis is typically very fact specific and
courts do get some leeway in conducting their conflict and field
preemption determinations. If the court "wants to avoid preemp-
27. JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW:
LEGISLATION, REGULATION AND LITIGATION 62-63 (American Bar Association 2006).
28. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
29. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 390
(Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2d ed. 2002).
30. Chicanos Por la Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
31. Id. at 985.
32. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
33. Id. at 79 n. 5.
2009] 151
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
tion, it can narrowly construe the federal objective and interpret the
state goal as different from or consistent with the federal purpose.
But if a court wants to find preemption, it can broadly view the fed-
eral purpose and preempt a vast array of state laws."" This leeway
sometimes leads to inconsistent and confusing results - even with
cases featuring relatively similar fact patterns. The Holk and Lock-
wood decisions are clear examples of this inconsistency and confu-
sion.
B. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp.
The New Jersey District Court issued the first opinion for a suit
questioning whether HFCS is allowed as an ingredient in food and
beverages labeled 'natural.' Stacy Holk (Holk plaintiff) brought suit
alleging violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, unjust
enrichment, and breach of express and implied warranties stem-
ming from Snapple Beverage Corporation's (Snapple) use of the
phrase 'All Natural' to describe its products." The Holk plaintiff
purchased two bottles of Snapple's Acai Blackberry Fruit Juice
Drink, which was labeled 'All Natural' and contained HFCS." The
Plaintiff alleged HFCS could not be considered 'natural' because it
does not "originate from natural sources, but instead [is] created
through 'enzymatically catalyzed chemical reactions in factories.'" 7
Snapple moved to dismiss the suit based on primary jurisdiction; the
court dismissed the suit based on implied preemption, never reach-
ing the primary jurisdiction issue."
In reaching its conclusion the court examined the preemption
issue through the lens of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)." The court began its analysis by noting the FDA promul-
34. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 398.
35. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F.Supp. 2d 447,448-49 (D. N.J. 2008).
36. Id. at 449.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 456 n. 5. Despite winning the suit, Snapple, sensing changing con-
sumer preferences, the potential for future lawsuits, and bad publicity, recognized
the victory as bittersweet. Snapple responded by continuing to label some of its
beverages as 'natural,' but chose to replace the HFCS with sugar so as to avoid the
future controversies and negative publicity. See also Jennifer Lee, Reading the Tea
Leaves, Snapple Refreshes Itself, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, available at
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/reading-the-tea-leaves-snapple-
refreshes-itself/.
39. Congress originally passed the FDCA in 1938, giving the FDA authority to
regulate the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY OF THE FDA: The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
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gated many regulations pertaining to the contents and labels of bev-
erages." The court next noted the FDA, under the authority of the
FDCA, thoroughly defined both 'artificial flavor' and 'natural fla-
vor.'' Finally, the court pointed out the FDA's current policy re-
garding the term 'natural' is to (1) "not restrict its use, except for
added color, synthetic substances, and flavors;" and (2) "that noth-
ing artificial or synthetic (including all color additives regardless of
source) has been included in, or has been added to, a food that
would not normally be expected to be in the food." 2
Holk next moved onto its legal analysis of the preemption issue.
The court first concluded Congress, when passing the FDCA, did
not intend to expressly preempt States' interest in protecting their
consumers against deception and fraud in the sale of food and bev-
erages; therefore, the Plaintiffs claim survived an express preemp-
tion analysis." Holk then examined whether the Plaintiffs state
claims were impliedly preempt. The court pointed out that even
though the FDA declined to undergo a rulemaking to define 'natu-
ral,' it did define 'natural flavor' and issued a policy statement de-
scribing its stance on the use of 'natural' on labels.' Further, the
FDA is obligated to follow its advisory opinions until such opinions
are amended or repudiated." The court highlighted the elaborate
regulations already established by the FDCA in regards to beverage
labeling." This fact, coupled with the FDA's policy statement de-
scribing the acceptable labeling use of 'natural,' led the court to
http://www.fda.gov/aboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm
[hereinafter HISTORY OF 1938 FDCA] (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
40. See Holk, supra note 35, at 450. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R § 102.33(1997) (defining
what phrases can appear on beverage labels depending on the ingredients used); 21
C.F.R. § 101.30 (listing requirements for the usage of certain phrases related to the
percentage juice declared on a beverages' label).
41. Id. at 450. Artificial flavor is "any substance, the function of which is to im-
part flavor, which is not derived from a spice, fruit or fruit juice, vegetable or vege-
table juice, edible yeast, herb, bark, bud, root, leaf or similar plant material, meat,
fish, poultry, eggs, dairy products, or fermentation products thereof." 21 C.F.R. §
101.22(a)(1) (2000). Natural flavor is defined as "the essential oil, oleoresin, es-
sence or extractive, protein hydolysate, distillate, any product of roasting, heating
or enzymolysis, which contains the flavoring constituents derived from" the above
list. 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(3) (2000).
42. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Defi-
nition of Terms, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2407 [hereinafter Food Labeling] (Jan. 6, 1993).
43. Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
44. Id.
45. Food and Drug Administration Advisory Opinions, 21 C.F.R § 10.85(e)
(2008).
46. Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
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conclude FDCA and FDA "regulations so thoroughly occupy the
field of beverage labeling... it would be unreasonable [for the court]
to infer Congress intended the states to supplement this area," and
deciding the Plaintiffs claims requires the court to effectively regu-
late in a field Congress intended the FDA to occupy exclusively."
Holk concluded by noting that allowing claims through state com-
mon law or statutes creates obstacles to Congress' objective in enact-
ing the FDCA, providing yet another reason to preempt the Plain-
tiffs claim."
C. Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.
A little less than one year after the Holk decision, Margot
Lockwood filed a similar suit in the California Northern District
Court alleging ConAgra Foods, Inc. (ConAgra) violated California's
Unfair Competition Law by engaging in misleading conduct result-
ing from the use of HFCS as an ingredient in Healthy Choice pasta
sauce labeled 'all natural.'5 ConAgra moved to dismiss on the
grounds the Plaintiffs claims were expressly preempted, or in the
alternative impliedly preempted by the provisions added to the
FDCA by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA).
Lockwood first noted Congress implemented the NLEA to
"clarify and strengthen [the FDA's] authority to require nutrition
labeling on foods, and to establish circumstances under which
claims may be made about the nutrients in foods."" The NLEA also
added an express preemption for state laws addressing certain sub-
jects covered by the FDCA, including some new labeling require-
ments added by the NLEA." Lockwood also criticized the decision
in Holk for failing to consider the changes to the FDCA caused by
Congress' implementation of the NLEA."
Lockwood also quickly shot down ConAgra's express preemp-
tion argument. The NLEA's express preemption contains language
47. Id.
48. Id. at 456.
49. Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
50. Id. at 1030 (citing National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F. 3d
878, 880 (10th Cir. 1997)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1034. Lockwood also correctly points out if the FDA did choose to
adopt formal regulations governing 'natural' labels for food and beverages it would
do so under the NLEA. Food labeling, supra note 42, at 2302. The FDA, did how-
ever, reaffirm their non-restrictive policy regarding the usage of 'natural' during the
passage of the NLEA. Id. at 2407.
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forbidding states from passing any requirement for the labeling of
food and beverages that is not already required by the FDCA." The
court explained the Plaintiffs claim as pled did not allege the pasta
sauce is misbranded or otherwise not in compliance with existing
FDCA labeling requirements; rather the claim alleged HFCS is not
produced by a natural process and therefore the pasta sauce does
not fit within the FDA's existing policy of 'natural.'" Since the Plain-
tiffs claim did not use California law to create a different labeling
requirement than required by the FDCA, the NLEA's added express
preemption provision did not apply."
Lockwood next examined whether the Plaintiffs claims were
impliedly preempted." Lockwood first discussed issues of field pre-
emption and departed from the reasoning of Holk to find that Con-
gress, with the passage of the NLEA, did not intend to occupy the
entire field of food and beverage labeling for three reasons. First,
the court pointed out the NLEA amended the FDCA to include an
express preemption provision that allowed states to issue regulations
identical to federal law." Second, Congress granted states sover-
eignty to independently regulate subject matters covered by the
NLEA as long as those state laws do not fall within the FDCA's ex-
press preemption provision." This includes the ability for states to
impose nutritional disclosure laws on local restaurants." Third, the
FDA, despite acknowledging consumers are sometimes misled by
the use of 'natural,' merely issued a policy statement and not a for-
mal legal requirement regarding the definition of 'natural.' Lock-
wood then addressed whether the plaintiffs claims were impliedly
preempted due to conflict preemption and held a manufacturer
53. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006).
54. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp 2d at 1031.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1031-34.
57. Id. at 1032.
58. Id. at 1032-33.
59. See New York State Restaurant Ass'n v. New York City Board of Health, 556 F. 3d
114 (2nd Cir. 2009) (upholding city law requiring certain restaurants to disclose
calorie content); Press Release, State of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs
Legislation Promoting Nutrition and Healthier Options (Sept. 30, 2008), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/10682 (signing legislation requiring restaurants
with twenty or more locations to disclose calorie content); Lainie Rutkow, et. al.,
Preemption and the Obesity Epidemic: State and Local Menu Labeling Laws and the Nutri-
tion Labeling and Education Act, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 772, 781 (2008).
60. See Lockwood 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34.
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could comply with the FDA's policy on the word 'natural' while still
following the state law providing the basis for the claim."
D. Flaws in the Holk and Lockwood Preemption Analysis
The Holk court erred by failing to consider how the provisions
of the FDCA added by the NLEA affected their preemption analysis,
but this error did not ultimately prove fatal to the court's reasoning.
The Lockwood court, despite ostensibly conducting the proper
analysis by using the additional NLEA provisions, still did not reach
the correct conclusion in denying ConAgra's motion to dismiss.
Ultimately, the Lockwood court failed to consider the proper Con-
gressional intent and surrounding circumstances behind the passage
of the FDCA and NLEA, which ultimately serve as clear signals the
plaintiffs state law claims needed to be preempted by the federal
regulations in question.
1. Congressional Intent Behind the Passage of the FDCA and the
NLEA
Since Congressional intent or purpose is the 'ultimate touch-
stone' in every preemption analysis," a brief background on the
FDCA and NLEA is a necessary starting ground. Congress, in re-
sponse to the public uproar caused by Upton Sinclair's muckraking
opus, "The Jungle," passed the Federal Food and Drugs Act (FFDA)
of 1906 (and the companion Federal Meat Inspection Act) to create
the Bureau of Chemistry, the direct forerunner to the modern
FDA." The FFDA, which gave the Bureau of Chemistry power to
regulate in an area - public health and welfare - traditionally occu-
pied by states, prohibited "the interstate transport of unlawful foods
and drugs under penalty of seizure of the questionable products
and/or prosecution of the responsible parties."' Congress passed
the FDCA in 1938, creating the modern FDA, in order to correct
the FFDA's lack of legally enforceable food standards, manufactur-
ers' ongoing abuses in food packaging and quality, and an absence
61. See id. at 1034-35.
62. Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
63. Walter F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA Consumer,
June 1981, available at http://www. fda.gov/aboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
History/Overviews/ucm056044.htm.
64. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, History of the FDA: The 1906 Food and
Drugs Act and its Enforcement, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/
sectionl.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
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in the regulation of therapeutic medicine.' The FDCA granted the
FDA broad authority to regulate food and beverage labeling and
also prohibited the introduction, adulteration or misbranding of any
food in interstate commerce.' The FDCA did not create a private
right of action." The FDA can enforce the FDCA and its regulations
through administrative proceedings.'
In 1990, Congress passed the NLEA, giving the FDA enhanced
control over nutritional labeling on all food and beverages.' The
NLEA represented an attempt by Congress to inform consumers of
the scientific advances linking health and nutrition and to eradicate
the American market of false and misleading label information."
Prior to enactment of the NLEA, Dr. Sullivan, head of the FDA, said
his department favored uniform federal standards for food labels
that would totally override state and local laws." Congress created
NLEA amendments specifically to "establish the circumstances un-
der which claims may be made about the nutrients in foods."" The
NLEA aimed to provide a streamlined, comprehensive system of
labeling easily understood by both consumers and manufacturers,
and also amended the FDCA to allow states to bring their own rights
of enforcement for violations of certain provisions." The NLEA also
strengthened the FDCA's preemption provision by expressly forbid-
ding any state or local laws which impose additional requirements or
different standards of identity on food and beverage labels."
2. Express Preemption Analysis in Holk and Lockwood
Holk and Lockwood examined the same FDCA provisions"
when conducting their respective express preemption analyses and
reached the same correct conclusion: Congress did not intend to
65. History of the 1938 FDCA, supra note 39.
66. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 331, 393.
67. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006).
68. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40 (2006).
69. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES
NUTRITION, AND HEALTH, REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION 250, 250 (2007).
70. Dietary Supplements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 103"' Cong. 1" Sess. 25 (1993) (testimony of Dr. David A.
Kessler, Commissioner Food and Drug Administration).
71. NESTLE, supra note 69, at 250.
72. National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F. 3d 878, 880 (11th Cir.
1997).
73. 21 U.S.C. § 337 (2006).
74. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006).
75. Id.
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expressly preempt the state tort law behind either Holk's or Lock-
wood's individual claim. The relevant FDCA section provides, "no
State or political subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly
establish under any authority or continue in effect as to any food in
interstate commerce..any requirement not identical" to certain
FDCA labeling requirements," including requirements to prevent
misbranding and false claims." None of the requirements found in
the FDCA, specifically attempt to define or regulate use of the term
'natural,' therefore, neither Holk nor Lockwood's claim fell within
the express preemption provision of the FDCA."
3. Mistakes in the Lockwood Implied Preemption Analysis
Holk and Lockwood both conducted an implied preemption
analysis, but reached different conclusions. Holk found the FDCA's
76. Id. at § 343-1(a).
77. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.343(k) (2006) (providing food is misbranded "[i]f it bears
or contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservative,
unless it bears label stating that fact.."); 21 U.S.C. § 343(c) (2006) (claiming a food
is mislabeled if it is an imitation of another food but does not indentify itself as an
imitation).
78. Despite the findings of both Holk and Lockwood, it is not out of the question
a court may find a substantially similar claim preempted because such a claim is in
fact adding extra requirements to the FDCA, as amended by the NLEA. "The term
'requirements'... reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regula-
tions to embrace common-law duties." Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC., 544 U.S. 431,
443 (2005). "In contrast, an 'occurrence that merely motivates an optional deci-
sion' - such as the threat of state law damages remedy for a violation of an existing
federal requirement - does not itself qualify as a requirement." In re PepsiCo, Inc.,
Bottled Water Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 588 F. Supp 2d 527, 532 (S.D.
NY 2008) (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 443). The PepsiCo court heard a consumer's
claim alleging fraudulent labeling on purified bottled water. The plaintiff claimed
state common law should not be preempted because the FDA specifically addressed
the labeling requirements for 'purified water' - the bottled water variety in question
-and chose to exempt 'purified water' from the same standards applied to the other
varieties of bottled water. The court still held the claim expressly preempts by the
federal regulation and the FDCA and rejected the plaintiffs claim that "state re-
quirements are permitted as long the federal standard does not specifically address
the terms..at issue". In re PepsiCo, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 538. This situation seems on
its face similar to the FDA's position on HFCS' inclusion in food and beverages
labeled 'natural.' The facts of PepsiCo may, however, be considered distinguishable
because, unlike the term natural, the FDA underwent a formal rulemaking to con-
struct labeling definitions for bottled water. The FDA specifically considered the
terms to appear on 'purified water' before finally deciding to exclude 'purified
water' from the final rule definitions, and also provided detailed reasons for this
decision. The FDA, on the other hand, explicitly declined to issue any sort of for-
mal rules with regard to HFCS or the phrase 'natural.'
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detailed and extensive regulatory scheme combined with the FDA's
implementing regulations impliedly preempted the Plaintiffs
claims." Lockwood, in reaching the opposite conclusion, pointed
out the reasoning in Holk was flawed because the Holk court did not
consider the new NLEA preemption provisions at any point in its
implied preemption analysis.' Even with inchoate reasoning stem-
ming from a failure to consider the added NLEA provisions, Holk
ultimately still arrived at the correct conclusion. By failing to find
the Plaintiffs claims impliedly preempt, the Lockwood court over-
looked or misconstrued several key issues.
In reaching its decision against implied preemption, the Lock-
wood court relied heavily on the NLEA's express savings clause,
which states "the [NLEA] shall not be construed to preempt any
provision of State law, unless such provision is expressly preempted
under..." various FDCA food and beverage labeling requirements."
Lockwood points out, because of this savings clause, Congress mani-
fested an intent not to solely occupy the field of food and beverage
nutritional labeling." The court indicated the mere presence of this
savings clause precluded the option of implied preemption." How-
ever, the Supreme Court does not give much weight to savings
clauses appearing in the same statute as a preemption provision."
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Court concluded a "savings
clause foresees - it does not foreclose - the possibility a fed-
eral..standard will preempt a state common law tort action with
which it conflicts."" The inclusion of a savings clause does nothing
to alter ordinary principles of preemption, including the standard
rules for finding a claim impliedly preempt." Further, the main
value in allowing state tort claims under a statute's savings clause is
preserving tort actions with deterrent value to achieve certain safety
standards." Neither the Holk nor Lockwood plaintiffs maintained a
concrete, actual physical injury similar to those found in other
product safety liability cases where state tort claims were allowed to
79. Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
80. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1032-33.
81. Id. at 1032 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006)).
82. Id. at 1033 - 34.
83. Id. at 1032 - 33.
84. See Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hou. L. REv. 1659, 1660 (2009).
85. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000). (finding a
claim preempt by "declin[ing] to give broad effect to a savings clause where doing
so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law").
86. Id. at 870-74.
87. Id. at 870.
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fill in the safety voids of federal regulation.' Moreover, the lack of
clear detrimental effects from HFCS consumption obviates the need
for these same state tort laws."
Congress did not expect to leave the entire field of food related
consumer protection in the hands of the FDA, but did intend to give
the FDA control of the entire field of establishing health and nutri-
tional labeling claims on food and beverages.' Congress recognized
state enforcement of FDA-created label standards is necessary to
overcome the lack of a private remedy in the FDCA." Simply pass-
ing legislation - merely having it in the books - is not the same as
actual enforcement; the rules need to have teeth and those teeth
need to bite. Congress, and the FDA itself, freely acknowledged a
lack of available resources to properly enforce all labeling regula-
tions," so it was only natural states be given the power to create pri-
vate rights of action to carry out their traditional duties of protect-
ing their citizens. Congress intended the NLEA to add state com-
mon law tort actions to enforce the federal standards of the FDCA."
However, when litigation wields state common law as a method to
supplement existing federal labeling standards, courts have repeat-
edly dismissed such suits. This is true, especially, when, much like
Lockwood, adjudicating the case would add or alter requirements to
88. See generally Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC., 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (holding
claims alleging damages from harmful pesticides brought under state tort law are
not preempted by the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide and Rodenticide Act);
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding the Federal Boat Safety Act
did not preempt all state law design defect damages). It is important to note, how-
ever, that neither of those statutes is as broad as the FDCA.
89. See discussion infra Part III.B.
90. The FDA's traditional mission statement is to develop policy and regulations
for nutritional labeling and food standards within the United States. U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, About FDA:
CFSAN-What We Do, available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/onplds.html. See
also Claudia L. Andre, What's in That Guacamole? How Bates and the Power of Preemp-
tion Will Affect Litigation Against the Food Industry, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 251
(2007).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 337 specifically allows states to bring certain actions themselves.
92. See Mary Mosquera, Lawmakers Say Budget Underfunds FDA, FEDERAL
COMPUTER WEEKS, Feb. 5, 2008, available at http://fcw.com/articles/2008/02/05/
lawmakers-say-budget-underfunds-fda.aspx [hereinafter Budget Underfunds FDA].
93. See Vermont Pure Holdings, LTD. v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc., 2006 WL
839486, 6-8 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding states can issue laws to supplement existing
federal regulations pertaining to bottled water). Cf. Mills v. Giant of Md., LLC, 441
F. Supp 2d 104, 105 (D.D.C. 2006) (dismissing a suit attempting to use state com-
mon law to add certain warnings to labels on containers of milk).
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the FDCA's and FDA's established national, uniform, food and bev-
erage labeling scheme.'
Lockwood also incorrectly found against implied preemption
based on the power of states to regulate subject matters addressed
by the NLEA, but also outside the FDCA's express preemption pro-
vision. For example, state and local governments are free to pass
their own regulations governing restaurants and menu disclosures."
The food served in restaurants, as well as prepared food served in
supermarkets or other chain eateries, is completely different than
the packaged food and beverages regulated by the FDCA and FDA
regulations. Packaged food and beverages, which are the products
covered by the FDCA, will be sold throughout the United States,
while the food and beverages falling under the areas left open by the
NLEA amendments are purchased and consumed within a single
state. This distinction is important because any federal law or regu-
lation with the goal of creating a uniform national system preempts
any state law that discriminates or places impositions on interstate
commerce." Allowing states or local governments to pass their own
menu disclosure laws does nothing to limit interstate commerce.
Allowing state tort claims to alter the usage of HFCS in one state
will force manufacturers to completely change their production
methods in that state, and may even expose the manufacturer to
unexpected state tort liability merely from placing their product in
the stream of commerce. Clearly, Congress did not intend to inten-
tionally allow state common law supplementation if such additions
would burden interstate commerce.
Lockwood also took issue with the FDA's repeated decisions
not to undergo a formal rulemaking to regulate the label usage of
'natural.' The court stated this repeated inaction indicated an intent
not to occupy the field. There is a fear by some courts that if the
federal government fails to act, and a court holds state law pre-
empted by this federal inaction, an area of public health or safety
94. See Mills, 441 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2006) (dismissing a suit to place warn-
ings on milk on the grounds the plaintiffs were trying to add requirements not
required by the FDCA); In re PepsiCo, Inc., Bottled Water Marketing and Sales Practices
Litigation, 588 F. Supp 2d 527 (S.D. NY 2008) (holding the FDCA preempted addi-
tional requirements imposed by plaintiffs state tort law claim based in an area
where the FDA previously issued a rule on labeling requirements).
95. New York State Restaurant, supra note 59.
96. See Robert L. Glicksman, Nothing is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void
Through Federal Preemption by Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 5, 20-21 (explaining the
Supreme Court often uses a justification for preemption that mirrors that of the
Commerce Clause).
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will go unregulated." This fear does not apply to the current con-
troversy because the usage of HFCS is already regulated by the FDA.
The FDA has periodically reviewed its policy and decided on main-
taining the current course of action." Despite, the reasoning of
Lockwood, there is no current regulatory gap affecting the health and
safety of citizens. Consumers may be confused by the meaning of
the term 'natural' on food and beverages, but the FDA, not the
states, is expressly charged under the FDCA and NLEA with rectify-
ing this confusion. If a manufacturer included HFCS as an ingredi-
ent in a product labeled 'natural,' but failed to disclose HFCS on the
ingredient list, a citizen can bring suit using state fraud claims, pro-
vided the state law is identical to the FDCA's misbranding or ingre-
dient disclosure provisions.' Or if a manufacturer knowingly used
an adulterated ingredient, a private citizen can seek damages based
on state tort law.oo States are still left with the power to use their
state common law to enforce any violations of the FDA policy and
regulation that may affect their citizens' health or safety.
Lockwood's reasoning also ignores traditional notions of admin-
istrative deference."' Congress granted the FDA the power to
choose when to - and by association the power not to - issue regula-
tions creating the reasonable definition for any food or beverage.
The relevant FDCA provision reads, "Whenever in the judgment of
the Secretary such action will promote honesty and fair dealing in
the interest of consumers, he shall promulgate regulations fixing
and establishing for any food..a reasonable definition and standard
of identity, [or] a reasonable standard of quality[.]"" The FDA used
its administrative judgment to issue a policy statement on the usage
of 'natural,' and then determined, based on its resource availability,
to leave the policy statement in place, despite its alleged defects.
This decision does not mean the FDA chose not to occupy this field,
97. Id. at 8.
98. Food Labeling, supra note 42.
99. 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (2000).
100. See In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1179 (Cal. 2008) (holding
neither the FDCA nor the NLEA added amendments shall be interpreted to pre-
empt food safety laws).
101. See Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See also Blake B. Johnson, The Supreme Beef
Case: An Opportunity to Rethink Federal Food Safety Regulation, 16 LOy. CONSUMER L.
REV. 159 (2004); Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1003 (2008).
102. 21 C.F.R. § 341 (2001).
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it merely decided its current level of occupation is proper. Lock-
wood failed in its reasoning by not respecting the FDA's decision.
Finally, Lockwood shot down the idea of conflict preemption by
stating a manufacturer could comply with the FDA's policy on 'natu-
ral' and still comply with the state law - as postulated in the case by
the plaintiff. 3 The Lockwood court also explained the plaintiffs in-
terpretation is not an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objec-
tives of the FDCA.'" Both these findings represent an epic failure in
reasoning. Prior to implementation of the NLEA, Congress consid-
ered the overall effect on manufacturers, including potential new
costs incurred, which would result from the NLEA's passage.'
Congress based its considerations solely upon new national federal
laws, not a myriad of patchwork state labeling requirements. If state
tort claims can be used to create 'natural' definitions that are differ-
ent than the policy statements issued by the FDA, then it follows
state tort claims can be used to alter any definitions that the FDA
purposefully and strategically left some wiggle room. This system
greatly hinders manufacturers' ability to know how to properly label
their products. Manufacturers are then exposed to huge amounts of
potential liability merely from inserting their products into the
stream of commerce. These two factors completely frustrate the
purpose behind the FDA's advisory system.'" The purpose of the
NLEA is to inform and educate, not confuse. Allowing for many
distinct state common law requirements for the usage of HFCS in
food and beverages labeled 'natural' frustrates this purpose. Stan-
dards can then be different in every state, leaving consumers with
the responsibility of figuring out what state their 'natural' food or
beverage came from, then keeping up with the labeling requirement
for that state, and finally trying to figure out if HFCS could be used
as an ingredient under that state's requirements.
E. Lockwood Erred by Not Applying the PrimaeryJurisdiction Doctrine
The primary jurisdiction doctrine also provides grounds for any
court to dismiss a state tort law claim based on the use of HFCS in a
103. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
104. Id.
105. See generally Administrative Law Review, The Impact of the Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act of 1990 on the Food Industry, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 605(1995) (discuss-
ing cost to manufacturers of the implementation of the NLEA and efforts of these
companies to lobby Congress).
106. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (2009).
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'natural' food or beverage. Primary jurisdiction allows for the
proper relationship between courts and administrative agencies.'
Primary jurisdiction encourages more informed legal decisions
through greater judicial utilization of administrative expertise, and
also maintains the uniform treatment of a regulatory scheme by leav-
ing critical decisions to the appropriate agency.'" The doctrine is
prudential and a court can consider whether to apply it whenever a
claim originates in the courts, and "enforcement of the claim re-
quires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body."'" In these situations, "the court may refer specific questions
to the administrative body responsible for deciding such ques-
tions.""' A judge, when contemplating whether to apply the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, must look towards the possibility that different
courts addressing the same regulatory issue will reach different re-
sults and these results may undermine the regulatory scheme."' The
judge also must consider whether the issue is "within the conven-
tional experience of judges.""2
Holk found the Plaintiffs claim impliedly preempted and thus
never reached the issue of primary jurisdiction because the Plain-
tiffs claims were found impliedly preempted."' Lockwood cited re-
cent primary jurisdiction jurisprudence finding the "court [may stay]
proceedings or dismiss the case without prejudice, so that the par-
ties may seek an administrative ruling.""' Lockwood then pointed out
there is no need to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine because
the FDA has repeatedly declined requests to formally define 'natu-
ral' due to lack of resources and other more pressing concerns."'
Lockwood, however, overlooked the fact the FDA has already issued a
statement on the labeling use of 'natural.' Over time, manufacturers
and other interested parties asked the FDA to examine that deci-
107. U.S. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
108. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 672 (2003) (Breyer, J.
concurring).
109. W. Pac RR, 352 U.S. at 64.
110. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F.Supp. 2d 447, 452 (D.N.J. 2008).
111. For a general background on the usage of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
see Aaron J. Lockwood, The Primary jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing Standards of
Appellate Review, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 732 (2007).
112. Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
113. Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 455 n. 5.
114. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1034-35 (citing Clark v. Time Warner Cable,
523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008)).
115. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
164 [VOL. 5:145
A HEALTHY DIET OF PREEMPTION
sion, and, after using its expertise on food and beverage labeling
and the best use of its own resources, the FDA consistently decided
the current policy of 'natural' is best left in place, without any addi-
tions or alterations. A court must not substitute its policy judgment
for that of the FDA, even if the FDA's judgment results in inaction.
An agency decision on how to best use its own resources must be
given deference by a court."' In Cohen v. McDonalds Corp., a court
dismissed a suit because settling the plaintiffs claim required the
court to fill holes in the NLEA the federal government had declined
to yet fill."' That decision emphasized that a state court could not
substitute its judgment for that of the FDA and any other result cre-
ates a danger of non-uniformity."' It is not a court's duty - nor
should it possess the power - to create or change a policy statement
in an area that an agency already considered settled. For these rea-
sons, Lockwood's initial determination to not apply the primary juris-
diction doctrine is incorrect.
Lockwood also found nothing involved in the Plaintiffs claim
can be considered a highly technical area where the FDA has greater
technical expertise than the court."' The judge must merely decide
whether the label claims are considered misleading under California
state law, and judges decide claims about misleading labeling all the
time.' By reaching this conclusion, Lockwood greatly oversimplifies
the real issue at hand. No judge could decide whether the label
found on the Healthy Choice Pasta Sauce is misleading without first
deciding whether HFCS is considered 'natural' under the FDA's cur-
rent guidance documents - a decision that cannot be accomplished
without employing a highly scientific analysis."' A judge deciding
whether the complex scientific reactions used to create and refine
HFCS are considered 'natural' will be conducting this highly scien-
tific and technical analysis in an area the FDA undoubtedly pos-
sesses substantially greater experience and knowledge. The judge is
essentially undertaking the job of an FDA scientist. The FDA itself
asserts science is a key foundation of any decision, and its scientists
116. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007)
(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
117. Cohen v. McDonalds Corp., 808 N.E.2d 1, 9-10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
118. Id. at 10.
119. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
120. Id.
121. See infra Part III.D.
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are rigorously trained.'" A judge must defer to the expertise of the
FDA and its scientists and apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine
rather than reaching a decision on whether HFCS can be used as an
ingredient in food and beverages labeled natural. A federal agency
specializing in food and beverage labeling is better equipped to
handle issues of label reform than the judiciary.
The FDA, for the previously discussed reasons of implied pre-
emption and primary jurisdiction, possesses the power to regulate
the usage of the term 'natural' on food and beverage labels. States
do possess some power in this field, but this power is merely sup-
plemental power; used to create additional means to enforce the
national policy set by the FDA or regulate areas, like local restaurant
nutritional disclosure requirements, purposefully left open by the
FDCA. Under the FDCA, states can still protect their citizens'
health and safety by allowing for common law enforcement against
adulterated or misbranded food and beverages. Private citizens,
however, may not use these state common law remedies to create or
alter established federal definitions or regulations. The judiciary
cannot use these claims to change the FDA's policy on the usage of
HFCS corn syrup as an ingredient in food and beverages labeled as
natural. The tort system is intended to compensate those wronged
or force other wrongdoers to pay the social costs of their activities.
Allowing state tort claims to alter FDA policy statements - stances
relied upon for several years by manufacturers - is in effect punish-
ing manufacturers for following federal law and allowing judges to
turn thoroughly vetted, carefully crafted Congressional into confus-
ing piecemeal. State tort claims must not be allowed to interfere
with the strong federal interest in allowing a federal agency to create
its own policy and regulation, especially when the duty underlying
the state tort claim involves the relationship between the manufac-
turer and the federal agency.'"
III. THE FDA SHOULD PROHIBIT HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP IN
FOOD AND BEVERAGES LABELED 'NATURAL'
The FDA must create a firm, unassailable answer to the ques-
tion of whether HFCS can be included as an ingredient in food and
beverages brandishing the label phrase 'natural.' The 'natural' food
122. See Linda Bren, FDA Science: Protecting America's Health, FDA Consumer,
March-April 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m1370/
is_237/ai99148091 1.
123. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintifs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
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and beverage market already features thousands of products, and is
growing rapidly. Manufacturers have used HFCS liberally as a
sweetener in almost every type of food and beverage imaginable
since the mid-1970's, including those labeled 'natural,' but health
and consumer advocates recently began to tout the detrimental ef-
fects of HFCS consumption on health. Consumers often purchase
these 'natural' products under the belief the product conjures some
sort of health benefit. The FDA, charged with regulating the vast
majority of products labeled 'natural' must take action to correct
consumer misconceptions and prevent unnecessary controversy -
while carefully avoiding the typical pitfalls surrounding any attempt
to create a new labeling regulation. Ultimately, the FDA must reach
a firm regulatory conclusion that HFCS cannot be used as an ingre-
dient on food and beverages labeled 'natural.'
A. Current Trends and FDA Regulation of the Phrase 'Natural' on Food
and Beverage Labels
A consumer walking into any supermarket will find a dizzying
array of products sporting labels claiming 'natural.' Recent reports
have, in fact, suggested at least 55,000 products use the word natural
on their label.' The sale of 'natural' food and beverages far out-
paced the sale of food and beverages labeled 'organic,' with esti-
mated 2008 sales of $22.3 billion compared to $4.9 billion, respec-
tively.2  The sales figures for 'natural' represent a ten percent in-
crease over 2007 sales and a thirty-seven percent increase from 2004
sales.'2 1 Sales for 'natural' labeled food and beverages are predicted
to continue to increase even further while sale of organic labeled
food and beverages appears to be leveling off.27
124. Brandweek.com, 'Natural' Beats 'Organic' in Food Sales, http://www.
brandweek.com/bw/content display/news-and-features/green-marketing/e3ilc36b
1b7ff4e76c1d373280605794dc0 [hereinafter Natural Beats Organic] (last visited Sept.
21, 2009).
125. Id. Other studies do indicate different sales figures and illustrate the total
amount of sales for the 'natural' and 'organic' labels can fluctuate greatly depend-
ing on the types of products included. See Food Marketing Institute, Natural and
Organic Sales (2007), available at http://www.fmi.org/media/bg/natural
organic foods.pdf (totaling 2006 sales of 'organic' labeled food and beverages at
$16.9 billion); see also Meredith Niles, New Data Show 2008 Organic Sales Will Reach
$32.9 Billion, GRisT, Sept. 11, 2008, available at http://www.grist.org/article/the-
organic-times-are-a-changin (grouping 'natural' and 'organic' food sales together
and finding 2008 combined sales projected to reach $32.9 billion).
126. Natural Beats Organic, supra note 123.
127. Id.
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Consumers generally perceive 'natural' food and beverages as
healthier than other products, but the 'natural' label often confers
no health benefits and in some cases may even be less healthy than
food and beverages not bearing such a label.'" The FDA's current
policy on the use of the word 'natural' is not to restrict its use except
for banning the addition of any added color, artificial or synthetic
substances not normally expected to be in the food or beverage."
This somewhat amorphous definition means manufacturers can eas-
ily craft their products to fit within the existing labeling regulations.
However, this creative process often comes at the expense of con-
sumers - albeit, consumers being misled by their own perceptions.
For example, both fat and salt are naturally occurring substances,
meaning inherently unhealthy food and beverages, like potato chips,
can be labeled 'natural."" These 'natural' products often contain
much greater amounts of fat and salt than their 'un-natural' coun-
terparts, completely undermining one of the main reasons consum-
ers choose to purchase the 'natural' product.' The FDA itself ad-
mits consumers thinking 'natural' implies health benefits are con-
fused by the term, but the FDA also explains 'natural' has a carefully
considered, and currently settled regulatory meaning.' Despite this
confusion, the FDA has denied requests to create a formal definition
citing a lack of resources and more pressing concerns in areas like
food safety.'
B. History and Controversy of High Fructose Corn Syrup
Adding to the confusion over the label use of 'natural' is the
FDA's current stance on whether products incorporating HFCS can
be labeled 'natural.' Scientists first created HFCS in 1957, and re-
128. See What Natural Really Means, supra note 7.
129. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.22 (1993) (created during the 1993 passage of the
NLEA).
130. What Natural Really Means, supra note 7.
131. Id.
132. United States Food and Drug Administration, Food Label Helps Consumers
Make Healthier Choices, http://www.fda.gov/consumer/updates/foodlabels
032708.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).
133. See Lorraine Heller, 'Natural' Will Remain Undefined Says FDA, FOOD
NAVIGAToR-USA, Jan. 4, 2008, available at http://www.foodnavigator-
usa.com/Financial-Industry/Natural-will-remain-undefined-says-FDA; see also
Lorraine Heller, HFCS is Not 'Natural, Says FDA, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA, Apr. 2,
2008, available at http:// www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Financial-Industry/HFCS-is-
not-natural-says-FDA [hereinafter HFCS Not Natural] (mentioning petitions from
Sara Lee and the Sugar Refiners).
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fined the manufacturing process to reach its present day efficiency
in the 197o's.' HFCS, aided by exceptionally favorable government
policy, quickly became the sweetener of choice for American food
and beverage manufacturers."' HFCS provides certain advantages
to food and beverage manufacturers: it is sweeter and easier to mix
than sugar; acts as a preservative and can extend product shelf life;
and is more economical to purchase and transport.'3  More and
more products began to take advantage of these benefits and the
average American's yearly HFCS consumption increased every year
until a 1998 peak of about sixty pounds per person.3 7  Today,
Americans consume more HFCS than almost any other country,
amounting to about forty-two pounds per person per year.'" One in
ten products ingested by Americans contains HFCS as an ingredi-
ent; including foods as unexpected as hamburger buns and 'healthy'
granola bars."'
Doctors, scientists, and dieticians recently began linking HFCS
with America's ever-increasing obesity and health problems. 1 4o Regu-
134. High Fructose Corn Syrup, http://www.oukosher.org/index.php/
common/article/2489 (last visited Nov. 19, 2009); LindaJoyce Forristal, The Murky
World of High-Fructose Corn Syrup, WISE TRADITIONS IN FOOD, FARMING, AND THE
HEALING ARTS (Fall 2001), available at http://www.westonaprice.org/
motherlinda/cornsyrup. html [hereinafter Murky World].
135. Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), one of the pioneering producers of HFCS,
and also one of America's largest corn producers, was arguably one of the most
politically connected companies in the 1970's and 1980's. Then CEO Dwayne An-
dreas was considered a good friend of Ronald Reagan. Soon after taking office,
then president Reagan instituted a harsh sugar import quota, which greatly in-
creased the price of sugar and forced major soft drink manufacturers to switch to
HFCS as a sweetener. Today ADM controls about one-third of the domestic HFCS
market, which brings ADM about $529 million in yearly profit. See Tom Philpott,
The Story Behind the Corn Industry's Annoying Ad Blitz, GRIST, Oct. 17, 2008
http://www.grist.org/article/the-bitter-with-the-sweet/ [hereinafter Ad Blitz] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2009).
136. Murky World, supra note 134; Guess What's Lurking in Your Food,
http://www.highfructosecornsyrup.org/2009/02/guess-whats-lurking-in-your-food.
html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) (explaining when coke switched to HFCS in 1983 it
is estimated they saved $750 million).
137. Ad Blitz, supra note 135.
138. Karen Gaudette, Is High-Fructose Corn Syrup Making Us Fat?, SEArrLE TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2007, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/foodwine/
2003559833_syrupo7.html.
139. Ad Blitz, supra note 135; Dr. Lonnie Lowry, Thank You for Guzzling Corn
Syrup, TMUSCLE, http://www.tmuscle.com/freeonlinearticle/sports-body-
training-performance-nutrition/thank-you-for-guzzling-corn-syrup [hereinafter
Guzzling Corn Syrup] (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
140. See generally George A. Bray et al., Consumption of High-Fructose Corn Syrup in
Beverages May Play a Role in the Epidemic of Obesity, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION
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larly consuming products containing high amounts of HFCS can be
a cause of type two diabetes, high blood pressure, and coronary ar-
tery disease."' Studies also show high amounts of ingested HFCS
can lead to leptin resistance."' Leptin is a hormone that helps the
body regulate hunger and energy expenditure."' When a body be-
comes resistant to leptin, rapid weight gain and obesity quickly fol-
low."' Increased fructose consumption also leads to disruption of
cell functioning and aging."' Some critics point out the widespread
use of HFCS may be damaging to the environment as well as con-
sumers' health."'
The supposed deleterious health effects and laboratory origins
of HFCS have led many to argue food and beverages using HFCS as
an ingredient should not be allowed to use the word 'natural' on the
label."' The Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) fired
the first salvo in the natural war against HFCS, threatening suit
against manufacturers Kraft and Cadbury Schweppes. CSPI alleged
fraud because Kraft and Cadbury Schweppes labeled their respective
beverages, Capri Sun, and 7Up, as 'natural' despite ingredients
prominently featuring, among other seemingly synthetic ingredi-
537, 537-43 (2004), available at http://www.ajcn.org/cgi/ content/fuIl/79/4/537
[hereinafter Consumption of HFCS]; Carolyn Poirot, High-Fructose Corn Syrup Fueling
Obesity Epidemic, Doctors Say, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/ health/2002658491 healthsyrupO4.html;
but cf Daniel Engber, Dark Sugar: The Decline and Fall of High-Fructose Corn Syrup,
SLATE, April 28, 2009, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2216796/ (noting the
perceived detrimental effects of a diet containing large amounts of HFCS, but also
finding those claims lacking hard evidence and nothing indicates HFCS is any more
detrimental to health than normal sugar); Ad Blitz, supra note 135 (noting almost all
studies on HFCS appear to be somewhat flawed based on the fact sources of fund-
ing typically come from biased sources like the Corn Refiners or the Sugar Refin-
ers).
141. Katherine Zeratsky, High-Fructose Corn Syrup: What are the Concerns?, Nutri-
tion and Healthy Eating, http:// www.mayoclinic.com/health/high-fructose-corn-
syrup/an01588 (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
142. Consumption of HFCS, supra note 139 at 538; Christine Gulifoy, Fructose Sets
Table for Weight Gain Without Warning, GENETIC ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
NEWS, Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://www.genengnews. com/news/
bnitem.aspx?name=43618189 [hereinafter Fructose Sets Table].
143. Fructose Sets Table, supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. Guzzling Corn Syrup, supra note 138.
146. Eviana Hartman, High-Fructose Corn Syrup: Not So Sweet for the Planet, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 9, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/03/06/AR2008030603294.html.
147. HFSC Not Natural, supra note 132.
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ents, HFCS."" Both companies recognized the potential negative
publicity and damages were not worth the potential new sales cre-
ated from the usage of the phrase 'natural,' and quickly agreed to
remove the word 'natural' from their respective beverages' labels
before the suits could move beyond the initial stages."'
The Corn Refiners Association (CRA) recently began to push
back against the negativity, launching an eighteen month campaign,
costing between $20-30 million, and targeting moms.'" The cam-
paign included a very intensive Internet presence."' HFCS has also
begun to garner some very unlikely defenders. Marion Nestle, a
nutritionist and author of several food policy books and articles, says
HFCS is undeserving of all the scrutiny.1 She says HFCS causes a
similar effect on the human body as sugar, and a more likely culprit
causing the decrease in American health is the widespread con-
sumption of sweeteners in general.'13 CSPI recently stated, although
148. Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Kraft is Sued for
Falsely Calling Capri Sun Drink "All Natural," Jan. 8, 2007, available at
http://www.cspinet.org/new/200701081.html; Press Release, Center for Science in
the Public Interest, CSPI to Sue Cadbury Schweppes Over "All Natural" 7UP, May
11, 2006, available at http:// www.cspinet.org/new/200605111.html.
149. Meg Marco, Capri Sun: High-Fructose Corn Syrup No Longer "Natural", THE
CONSUMERIST, Jan. 23, 2007, available at http://consumerist.com/consumer/capri-
sun/highfructose-corn-syrup-no-longer-natural-230839.php; Jessica Fraser, 7UP
Drops "All Natural" Claim After CSPI Threatens Lawsuit, NATURAL NEWS, Jan. 17,
2007, available at http://www.naturalnews.com/021443.html; see also supra note 38
and accompanying text.
150. Ad Blitz, supra note 135. The ads featured on www.sweetsurpirse.com depict
several outdoor scenarios. In several ads a child is offered an ice pop or fruit drink
containing HFCS and their mother objects, with as much gusto as if their child was
offered drugs. The snack offering mother then launches into a speech about how
HFCS comes from corn so it is 'natural,' safe, and no more harmful than sugar.
Newly informed, the first mother then gladly gives their child the HFCS-laden
snack.
151. See The Facts about High Fructose Corn Syrup, www.sweetsurpise.com (last
visited Sept. 27, 2009). The President of the Corn Refiners Association, charged
with damage control duty, left the very first reader comment for an article slightly
critical of HFCA. See Ad Blitz, supra note 135. Also, when entering a search on
Google for high fructose corn syrup the featured advertisement at the top of the
page is for www.sweetsurprise.com. See Google, High Fructose Corn Syrup,
http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=navclient&aq=lh&oq=high+f&ie=UTF-
8&rlz=1T4GGIHenUS264US265&q=high+fructose+corn+syrup (last visited Sept.
27, 2009).
152. See Lisa McLaughlin, Is High-Fructose Corn Syrup Really Good for You?, TIME,
Sept. 17, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
0,8599,1841910,00.html [hereinafter Is HFCS Good for You?].
153. See id.; see also Melanie Warner, A Sweetener with a Bad Rap, NEW YORK TIMES,
July 2, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/02/business/
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it strongly maintains HFCS cannot be included in foods and bever-
ages labeled 'natural', HFCS and sugar appear to be nutritionally
similar."
Two recent statements by the FDA did nothing but add to the
confusion. A website specializing in food and beverage issues sub-
mitted a request, through a FDA process which allows manufactur-
ers with doubts on the usage of certain ingredients to request guid-
ance, asking whether, under the current definitions, HFCS could be
considered natural.'" The FDA responded by stating the typical
process used to produce HFCS "would not be consistent with our...
policy regarding the use of the term 'natural.""" This statement
caused an immediate reaction from the powerful CRA.'" Based on
a different HFCS production process submitted by the Archer
Daniels Midland Company (ADM), a prominent and outspoken
CRA member, the FDA promptly (within three months) backtracked
and reverted to its original stance that HFCS production fit under
the current definition of 'natural." 8
C. Methods for the FDA to Create More Stringent Requirements for the
Appearance of 'Natural' on a Label
The recent lawsuits, coupled with widespread consumer confu-
sion - acknowledged by even the FDA itself - indicate the FDA must
meet its statutory mandate by taking action to settle the current con-
troversy surrounding the use of HFCS as an ingredient in food and
beverages labeled 'natural.' Congress passed the NLEA with the
goal of educating consumers about misleading labels and also in-
forming Americans about the connection between their health and
the foods and beverages they purchase.' Creating easy to under-
stand labels is a duty Congress clearly intended for the FDA. The
yourmoney/02syrup.html. But see Guzzling Corn Syrup, supra note 139 (explaining
HFCS is metabolized differently than sugar).
154. See Is HFCS Good for You?, supra note 152.
155. HFSC Not Natural, supra note 133.
156. Id.
157. Laura Crowley, HFCS is Natural, Says FDA in a Letter, Food Navigator-USA,
July 8, 2008, available at http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Financial-
Industry/HFCS-is-natural-says-FDA-in-a-letter [hereinafter HFCS is Natural].
158. Id. See also Letter from Geraldine A. June, Supervisor FDA Product Evalua-
tion and Labeling Team, to Audrae Erickson, President Corn Refiners Association,
July 8, 2008, available at http://www.corn.org/FDAdecision7-7-08. pdf [hereinafter
HFCS Letter].
159. National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F.3d 878, 880 (10th Cir.
1997).
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FDA also recognizes this important responsibility toward consumers,
as Barbara Schneeman, Ph.D., Director of the FDA's Office of Nutri-
tion, Labeling, and Dietary Supplements, recently explained, "the
food label is one of the most valuable tools consumers have."1" The
FDA is also required to provide manufacturers with guidance to en-
sure food and beverage production practices fall within federal re-
quirements."' The FDA, by not crafting a firm answer to whether
HFCS can be used as an ingredient in food and beverages labeled
'natural' is failing both of these tasks. However, a careful considera-
tion of the optimal dedication of agency resources is necessary be-
fore the FDA chooses the best path to rectify this shortcoming.
The FDA previously attempted to stringently regulate 'natural'
during the passage and implementation of the NLEA before ulti-
mately settling on the current policy due to resource limitations.'"
The FDA regulates an unfathomably large amount of products,
which account for about $1 trillion in consumer spending every
year, or twenty-five cents of every consumer dollar spent in Amer-
ica.' Despite this wide swath of responsibility, the FDA is fre-
160. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food Label Helps Consumers Make Health-
ier Choices, http://www.fda.gov/ forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm094536.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
161. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (2009).
162. Food Labeling, supra note 42. See Proposed Trade Regulation Rule; explana-
tion of Proceeding and Analysis: Statement of Issues; Opportunity to Submit Data,
Views or Arguments, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,842, 39.844 (proposed Nov. 11, 1974) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437). Proposed Trade Regulation Rule 40 Fed. Reg.
23,086, 23,090 (proposed May 28, 1975) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437). Final
Notice Regarding Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 41 Fed. Reg. 8,980, 8,982 (Mar.
2, 1976) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437). The FTC ultimately terminated the
rulemaking in 1983 because of the difficulty in defining 'natural' in manner that
would be meaningful to a consumer in the wide variety of situations that manufac-
turers use the term 'natural.' See Termination of Proposed Trade Regulation; Rule
on Food Advertising, 48 Fed. Reg. 23,270 (proposed May 24, 1983) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. 437) (explaining consumers do not expect the same thing from 'natu-
ral' apples that they do from 'natural' ice cream). The FTC ultimately concluded to
concentrate their resources on "more serious consumer protection problems. Id.
163. Jane E. Henney, M.D., Comm's of Food and Drugs, U.S. Food and Drug
Admin., Remarks at the Ass'n of Am. Medical Colleges Council of Teaching Hospi-
tals Spring Meeting (May 11, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.
fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm054216.htm). See also Nicole Gavotte and
Duane Stafford, Obama Budget Boosts Food-Safety with Record FDA Hike (update2),
bloomberg.com, May 7, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/ apps/news?pid
=20601202&sid=aqJqlXskQm4A(last visited Sep. 26, 2009).
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quently described as "chronically underfunded."" Members of
Congress referred to recent FDA budget as "grossly inadequate" to
meet the extensive demands placed upon the agency.'" The FDA
2009 budget saw only a $130 million increase from 2008; all of this
new money is already earmarked for issues of food protection,
medical device safety, and administrative costs." President Obama
has indicated renewed commitment to the FDA.'" However, Presi-
dent Obama and Congress dedicated no money in the American
and Reinvestment Act specifically to the FDA.I" Further, the major-
ity of this newfound presidential commitment revolves around a
renewed vigor to strengthen America's food safety, especially in
light of the recent tainted peanut and pistachio- fueled salmonella
scares.'" Despite these limitations, the FDA cannot continue with
the current weak and waffling policy on HFCS. The FDA must fol-
low the Congressional intent behind the passage of the NLEA and
remove the ambiguity surrounding whether HFCS can be consid-
ered a 'natural' ingredient.
Both Sara Lee Corporation and the Sugar Refiners of America
recently petitioned the FDA to harmonize its definition of natural
with that of the USDA in order to maintain consistency across fed-
eral agencies regarding the usage of 'natural."o The USDA cur-
164. Mary Mosquera, Lawmakers Say Budget Underfunds FDA, FEDERAL COMPUTER
WEEK, Feb. 5, 2008, available at http://fcw.com/articles/2008/02/05/lawmakers-
say-budget-underfunds-fda.aspx.
165. Id.; see also Lisa Richwine, Obama Picks FDA Chief Starts Food Safety Panel,
REUTERS, March 14, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE52DOKJ20090314 [hereinafter Obama Picks FDA Chief ] .
166. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 2009 FDA Budget Summary Fact Sheet (2009),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/
2009FDABudgetSummary/ucm111422.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
167. See Jeremy P. Jacobs, Obama Vows to Improve the FDA, THE HILL, March 14,
2009, http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/obama-vows-to-improve-the-fda-2009-03-
14.html [hereinafter Obama Vows to Improve the FDA] (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). See
also Obama Picks FDA Chief, supra note 165.
168. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H-R-1, 111th Cong.
(2009) (enacted), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
ARRA-publicjreview.
169. See Obama Vows to Improve the FDA, supra note 167; Obama Picks FDA Chief,
supra note 165.
170. See A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Labeling Controversies,
Biotechnology Litigation, and the Safety of Imported Food, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 253, 269-
270 (2007); Sara Lee Corp., Citizen Petition Requesting FDA to Develop Require-
ments for the Use of the Term "Natural" Consistent with the USDA's Food Safety
and Inspection Service (Apr. 9, 2007), available at www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/dockets/07p0147/07p-0147-ackOO01-voll.pdf; HFCS Not Natural,
supra note 132.
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rently regulates 'natural' labeling claims on meat and poultry.'
These policies are substantially similar to the FDA policy, but im-
pose an additional requirement that meat or poultry be 'minimally
processed."' However, the USDA regulates a significantly smaller
variety of products than the FDA. In fact, very few USDA products
even feature multiple ingredients,'" and almost no USDA product
uses HFCS as an ingredient, so the FDA cannot easily use the
USDA's 'natural' definition to solve the current problem."'
A rulemaking procedure to define 'natural,' however, is not the
answer either because any agency attempting to formulate a stan-
dard regulatory definition for a broad category of food conjures
upon itself an enormous crunch of agency resources - both mone-
tary and personnel.7 The USDA encountered this problem first
hand when it attempted to create formal regulations for the label
usage of 'organic.' Congress first charged the USDA with creating a
set of organic farming standards with the passage of the Organic
Foods Production Act as part of the 1990 Farm Bill."' The USDA's
initial attempt to craft a definition was met with the most comments
of any regulation in USDA history: over 275,000.'" More than ten
years passed before the USDA issued a final rule in 2002.'" Both
'organic' and 'natural' have similar markets and are used on millions
171. USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service, Meat and Poultry Labeling
Terms, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fact Sheets/Meat_&_PoultryLabelingTerms/
index.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
172. Id.
173. See id. (listing the different USDA label requirements for meat and poultry).
174. The USDA is currently in the midst of a rulemaking to remove specific in-
gredients from the definition of 'natural' and the FDA may eventually be able to
use this rulemaking as a loose template for an alternative method to regulate HFCS
without having to undertake a massive full blown 'natural' definition. See Product
Labeling Definition of the Term "Natural", 71 Fed. Reg. 233, 70, 504-04 (Dec. 5,
2008), available at http-//www.thefederal register.com/d.p/2006-12-05-06-9546.
175. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative
Law, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1749 (2007) (describing traditional procedures and obsta-
cles an agency faces when undergoing a rulemaking); Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of
Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 533, 36-37
(2000) (summarizing the exact requirements every agency must fulfill during a
rulemaking).
176. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-624, (codified at 7 USC
§ 6501-6522 2000).
177. Michelle T. Friedland, You Call That Organic? - The USDA's Misleading Food
Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379, 383 (2005).
178. USDA Economic Research Service, Final Organic Rule Governs Marketing
and Production, http://www.ers.usda. gov/features/organic/ (last visited Sept. 27,
2009).
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of products, so the FDA can reasonably infer from the USDA's
tribulations what an attempt to define the term 'natural' might cost.
The FDA, currently spread thin due to a lack of resources, and
charged by the new administration with shifting their mission and
majority of new resources heavily towards food safety, cannot afford
to waste twelve years of precious resources and personnel on for-
mally defining 'natural."' Undertaking a formal - or even informal
notice and comment - rulemaking to define the usage of every food
and beverage labeled 'natural' will exacerbate the current resource
problems frequently cited by the FDA.'o
The FDA also cannot merely issue another advisory opinion or
guidance document on whether HFCS is 'natural.' The FDA flip-
flopped their stance twice in a matter of months, weakening the cur-
rent policy and creating uncertainty.'"' Manufacturers need the FDA
to take a reliable stance to avoid multi-million dollar lawsuits despite
acting in good faith and ostensibly following FDA regulations.
179. Due to the massively growing 'natural' label food market and the potential
for controversy and confusion surrounding the meaning of 'natural' the FDA will
eventually need to find resources to create a formal rule for natural, and this may
very well happen in the near future if the current administration keeps its promise
to continue to raise FDA funding. Creating a formal definition of 'natural' is even
more important with the recent focus on using the legislative process to quell
America's growing obesity problem placing an emphasis the connection between
food and health and leading towards the creation of ideas like New York's potential
new 'obesity tax' on soda. See David Leonhardt, Soda Tax a Tempting Target, NEW
YORK TIMES, May 19, 2009, available at http:// www.nytimes.com/
2009/05/20/business/economy/20eonhardt.html?_r-2&ref=business. See also
generally Benjamin Montgomery, The American Obesity Epidemic: Why the U.S. Gov-
ernment Must Attack the Critical Problems of Overweight and Obesity Through Legislation,
4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 375 (2008) (putting forth various suggestion on how
government can use legislation to curb obesity and other self-induced health prob-
lems); David G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15
GEO. MASON L. REV. 681 (2008) (explaining the effects of laws on human behaviors,
with particular attention paid to the affect on obesity creating habits).
180. See Seidenfeld, supra note 175.
181. In response to a 2006 petition by the Sugar Refiners Association the FDA
cites their longstanding policy on the usage of HFCS in natural. See Letter from
Audrae Erickson, President, Corn Refiners Association, to FDA Dockets Manage-
ment Branch (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/DOCKETS/dockets/06p0094/06p-0094-c000004-voll.pdf. The FDA re-
versed this longtime stance with a guidance letter written in April 2008 explaining
HFCS may not be considered natural. See HFSC Not Natural, supra note 132. But
then, after a meeting with an Archer Daniels Midland executive, the FDA quickly
reversed back to their original position within a few months. See HFCS is Natural,
supra note 157; HFCS Letter, supra note 158.
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Some scholars also criticize the FDA for using guidance documents
to create "de facto rules" that avoid procedural safeguards.' 2
The FDA need not undergo a complex and lengthy rulemaking
process to create a formal definition of 'natural' to solve this HFCS
controversy, but can still provide an optimal solution by conducting
an informal notice and comment rulemaking to determine whether
HFCS is considered synthetic or artificial, regardless of the process
used for creation. Finding HFCS synthetic precludes it from being
used as an ingredient in products labeled 'natural' and avoids the
need to create a regulatory definition for the entire class of 'natural'
products. Determining whether HFCS is synthetic is also more of a
marketing issue for labeling usage and can then avoid the loaded
question of whether the consumption of HFCS is truly detrimental
to ones' health. This means many comments can be avoided, greatly
truncating the notice and comment process. Choosing this small-
scale regulation path will ultimately prove optimal because it is the
quickest and most budget conscious method to provide a firm an-
swer and obviate the potential for ample controversy in a hot topic
area that the FDA is mandated to govern.
D. The FDA Needs to Create a Regulation Banning the Use of High Fruc-
tose Corn Syrup in Food and Beverages Labeled 'Natural'
Any decision the FDA makes on the usage of HFCS must take
into account both the scientific origins of HFCS as well as consum-
ers' expectations for a 'natural' product. The FDA's current policy
on 'natural' is not based on a traditional dictionary definition of the
words natural and synthetic,'" but the majority of Americans never-
theless think food and beverages labeled 'natural' are healthier
products, or at the very least do not contain ingredients formulated
through a multiple-step laboratory process.'" Not only is HFCS not
found in nature, but the HFCS production uses chemical processes
and laboratory created enzymes, or as described in Holk: "enzymati-
cally catalyzed chemical reactions in factories.""
182. Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional
and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 905 (2008).
183. Food Labeling, supra note 42. Even dictionaries have a hard time defining
'natural.' Dictonary.com lists 38 separate definitions, http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/natural?qsrc-2888 (last visited Mar. 30, 2010), and Merriam
Webster lists 15 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/natural (last visited
Mar. 30, 2010).
184. See What Natural Really Means, supra note 7.
185. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F.Supp. 2d 447, 449 (D. N.J. 2008).
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The modern HFCS production method starts with the fructose
found in corn.'" HFCS manufactures begin the production process
by treating cornstarch with a purified enzyme, alpha-amylase, pro-
ducing shorter chains of sugar called polysaccharides." Then an-
other enzyme, glucoamylase, breaks the polysaccharides down even
further, into glucose. A third enzyme, glucose-isomerase is then
used to convert the glucose into a mixture of about forty-two per-
cent fructose and between fifty and fifty-two percent glucose, with
some other sugars mixed in. Glucose-isomerase is expensive, so
unlike the first two enzymes which are simply added to the mixture,
glucose-isomerase is packed into columns with a synthetic fixing
agent, and the sugar mixture is passed over it. The glucose-
isomerase is reused until it loses its activity. Two other steps, involv-
ing a liquid chromatography and back-blending are used to convert
the forty-two percent fructose mixture into industry standard HFCS.
CRA argues none of these 'synthetic fixing agents' actually
comes into contact with the soon-to-be HFCS, and the artificial
agents are washed away before the end product is created.'" The
mere presence, and requirement, of these artificial fixing agents, is
however, mocking the FDA's current policy on 'natural.' Clearly a
synthetic ingredient is being added and included in the food, but
HFCS escapes scrutiny by removing or washing the synthetic ingre-
dient from the end product."' The FDA needs to close this washing
process loop hole.
The FDA also admits HFCS can be created from different proc-
esses, one method falling within the current 'natural' usage policy
and other methods falling outside that policy.'" The FDA does not
have the resources to determine which process a manufacture used
to create the HFCS that ultimately ends up in food or beverages
labeled natural."' If the FDA itself cannot easily identify whether a
particular HFCS production process is the process falling within the
'natural' definition, consumers stand little or no chance. Therefore,
in order to live up to the Congressional mandates of the FDCA and
186. Murky World, supra note 134.
187. Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 450; Murky World, supra note 134.
188. HFCS Letter, supra note 158.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See FDA, Guide to Inspection of Manufacturers of Miscellaneous Food Prod-
ucts - Volume II, http://www.fda. gov/ora/Inspect ref/igs/foodsp2a.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2009) (listing FDA inspection techniques and requirements); see also
Obama Picks FDA Chief, supra note 165 (explaining the FDA only possesses the re-
sources to inspect 7,000 out of approximately 150,000 food-processing plants).
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NLEA, based on the science behind the production of HFCS, and
consumer perceptions, the FDA must undertake a rulemaking, and
after considering all the evidence, issue formal regulations declaring
HFCS 'synthetic' or artificial and ineligible for use in food and bev-
erages labeled 'natural.'
V. CONCLUSION
Americans today are facing a health crisis and are turning to
the food they eat to rectify this problem. These same Americans are
increasingly using food and beverage labels as a means to achieve
their goals of improved health. Consumers put great stock in the
supposed health benefits of food and beverages labeled 'natural'
without knowing the true contents of these same 'natural' products.
The FDA, however, has a statutory mandate to educate consumers
about the relation between the food they purchase and its label, and
also protect against misleading labeling. Congress also gave the
FDA the express power to create, and also modify, federally stan-
dardized labeling requirements. Well-settled standardized labels
benefit both consumers and manufacturers alike. Nonetheless, the
administrative world is not perfect, and the FDA must make tough
choices on how to best achieve its mandates and still balance the
often competing interests of manufacturers and consumers.
Consumers, frustrated with the results of this balancing act, re-
cently attempted to use state tort law to challenge the FDA's flimsy
definition of 'natural.' These suits ignore the FDA's carefully con-
sidered policy choices relating to the phrase 'natural,' as well as
Congress' intention to give the FDA the sole power to make these
choices. Holk, properly recognizing the ultimate preemptory power
of both FDA regulations and the FDCA, dismissed the claim by its
plaintiff. Lockwood failed to realize the myriad of reasons why its
plaintiffs claim should be dismissed due to implied preemption.
Congressional intent through the passage of the FDCA and NLEA,
combined with the FDA's regulations and policy statements on the
use of the term 'natural' - even if considered by some to be inade-
quate or inconsistent - preempts state laws. Judges should also not
attempt to color in potential gray areas involving the definition of
'natural' and the usage of HFCS. They should instead defer to
agency expertise and apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In
the future, similar suits should be dismissed for these preemptory
reasons, and in the alternative due to the doctrine of primary juris-
diction.
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A tempest of controversy is brewing around the usage of HFCS,
and many parties are claiming HFCS just is not 'natural.' The FDA
needs to flex its ultimate decision making muscle and create a firm
regulation pertaining to the usage of HFCS. The FDA can quell any
controversy or confusion by finding HFCS synthetic and thus not
allowed in food and beverages wishing to use the labeling term
'natural.' In the end, the word corn is truly the only part of High
Fructose Corn Syrup that fits any definition of 'natural.'
